United Nations Operation in Somalia II

On 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council his recommendations for effecting the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II. He noted that despite the size of the UNITAF mission, a secure environment was not yet established. There was still no effective functioning government or local security/police force.[11] The Secretary-General concluded that, should the Security Council determine that the time had come for the transition from UNITAF to UNOSOM II, the latter should be endowed with enforcement powers under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter to establish a secure environment throughout Somalia.[11] UNOSOM II would therefore seek to complete the task begun by UNITAF. The new mandate would also empower UNOSOM II to assist in rebuilding their economic, political and social life, so as to recreate a Somali State. Most notably it would also mandate the disarmament of Somali militias.[12]

The new UN-controlled mission, to be called UNOSOM II, was established by the Security Council in Resolution 814 (1993) on 26 March 1993. It did not formally take over operations in Somalia until UNITAF was dissolved on 4 May 1993.

Major disagreements between the UN and the Somali National Alliance began soon after the establishment of UNOSOM II, centering on the perceived true nature of the operations political mandate. In May 1993, relations between the SNA and UNOSOM would rapidly deteriorate following two significant events.[12]

While the Addis Ababa conference was in progress in March, pro-Siad Barre forces - vehemently opposed to Aidid, began to infiltrate weapons into the Somali port city of Kismayo, which was under the control of UNITAF forces at the time. Gen. Hersi Morgan, commander of the pro-Barre forces, drove out the Somali National Alliance forces under the command of Col. Omar Jess.[12]

On 7 May, three days after UNOSOM II took control of Kismayo from UNITAF, the SNA made an attempt to retake the city. During the assault the Belgian peacekeepers stationed in the town intervened, considering the assault to take Kismayo an attack on their positions and consequently repelled the SNA forces. The fall of Kismayo to Gen. Morgan infuriated the Somali National Alliance. To the SNA the incident was viewed as blatant U.N. partiality, as UNITAF had failed to prevent Morgan from seizing the city and UNOSOM had then fought SNA forces who had tried to retake it.[12]

In May, Gen. Aidid and Col. Abdullahi Yusuf of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front would agree to hold a peace conference for the central region of Somalia. Gen. Aidid had initiated the consultations with Col. Yusuf and consequently viewed himself as the convener and chair of the conference who would be responsible for establishing the agenda. He would invite Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia, Adm. Johnathan Howe to open the conference.[12]

Aidid sought to focus the conference only on Somalia's central regions, and soon ran into conflict with UNOSOM. The UN sought to broaden participation of the conference to other regions of Somalia and suspicious of Aidid, sought to replace his chairmanship over the conference with former Somali President Abdullah Osman, who hated Aidid and had publicly called for his arrest.[12]

The differences between Aidid and the UN proved to be to great, and the conference proceeded without the United Nations participation. The contention between the Somali National alliance and UNOSOM from that point forward would begin to manifest in anti-UNOSOM propaganda broadcast from SNA controlled Radio Mogadishu.[12]

Radio Mogadishu was a highly popular broadcast station with the residents of the city, and was a vital piece of SNA infrastructure that had been captured following a vicious battle with Ali Mahdi's forces. Following the Kismayo and Galkayo incidents that station began to air anti-UNOSOM propaganda, incensing high ranking UN personnel. It was feared that the broadcasts would shift the attitudes of the Somali public towards the United Nations operation, leading UNOSOM officials to resolve to close the station. In mid-May, the Pakistani contingent was asked to draw up a plan to shut down the station. The Pakistanis did not possess the technical expertise required for such an operation and requested that the US supply experts.[12][15]

Importantly, Radio Mogadishu had also been an Authorized Weapons Store Site (AWSS), subject to UNOSOM inspection. It was decided the American special forces technicians would accompany a Pakistani weapons inspection team to the site in order to determine how to disable the station. Gen. Aidid and the upper echelons of the Somali National Alliance, had been made aware of the discussions to seize or destroy the station.[12]

According to the 1994 United Nations Inquiry:

Opinions differ, even among UNOSOM officials, on whether the weapons inspections of 5 June 1993 was genuine or was merely a cover-up for reconnaissance and subsequent seizure of Radio Mogadishu.[16]

On June 5, a Pakistani force was sent to investigate an arms depot belonging to a Somali warlord vying for the Presidency, Mohamed Farrah Aidid. When the Pakistani force arrived, they encountered angry Somali protesters. Twenty-four Pakistani soldiers inspecting weapons as part of the expanded UN mandate were killed when "forces believed to be associated with Aidid allegedly launched a fatal attack on peacekeeping forces."[17]

The UN responded the next day with Resolution 837, reaffirming that the secretary-general was authorized to "take all necessary measures against those responsible for the armed attacks and to establish the effective authority of UNOSOM II throughout Somalia."[18] This was essentially equivalent to declaring war on Aidid, a declaration that would lead to numerous confrontations between UNOSOM II personnel and Aidid's militia. Though UNOSOM II had much fewer war-fighting resources than UNITAF, but it was much more ambitious and aggressive. On 12 June 1993 U.S. troops began a military offensive around Mogadishu. On 17 June, a $25,000 warrant was issued by Admiral Jonathan Howe for information leading to the arrest of Aidid, but he was never captured.[14]

The hunt for Aidid characterised much of the UNOSOM II intervention. The increasing tempo of military operations carried out in Mogadishu began to cause civilian casualties and affected the relationship between the foreign troops and the Somali people. The UN troops were portrayed as foreign interlopers, particularly after incidents of civilian casualties caused by wholesale firing into crowds by peace keepers.[19][20]

On the 12th of July, a house where a meeting of clan elders was taking place was attacked by US AH-1 Cobra helicopters in what became known to the Somalis as Bloody Monday.[21]

As the Americans became more insular, the warlords began to reassert control of many Mogadishu districts. With each failure to apprehend Aidid, the militias grew more bold. Serious rifts between nations contributing to UNOSOM II also began to develop, with Italy in particular being a major critic of the American methods.[22]

Somali militias began targeting peacekeepers, causing further casualties. On 8 August, Aidid's militia detonated a remote controlled bomb against a U.S. military vehicle, first killed four American soldiers and then, two weeks later, injured seven more.[23] In response, President Bill Clinton approved the proposal to deploy a special task force composed of 400 US Army Rangers and Delta-force Commandos.[21]

This unit, named Task Force Ranger, consisted of 160 elite US troops. They flew to Mogadishu and began a manhunt for Aidid in what became known as Operation Gothic Serpent. On October 3, 1993, Task Force Ranger raided a hotel in Mogadishu in which Aidid was thought to be hiding. What ensued was the longest, bloodiest and deadliest battle for US troops in Somalia. In what later became known as the Battle of Mogadishu, eighteen US soldiers were killed. Images of their dead bodies being dragged through the streets were broadcast on television stations all over the world, horrifying and infuriating the American public.

The month following the Battle of Mogadishu, the United States urged the United Nations to establish the commission to determine who was responsible for the clashes between UNOSOM II peacekeepers and Aidid's SNA forces. A three-man UN inquiry commission headed by Matthew Nglube, former chief justice of Zambia, Gen. Emmanuel Erskine of Ghana and Gen. Gustav Hagglund of Finland was set up by the Security Council. On 30 November 1993 the commission landed in Mogadishu.[28][12]

The report charged the Gen. Aidid with launching the 5 June 1993, attack which initiated the conflict between the SNA and UNOSOM. Notably, it also heavily criticized U.N. peacekeeping officials for embarking on a campaign of forceful disarmament of Somali factions, an effort that antagonized the Aidid's forces and sharpened tensions. The commission questioned the merit of the aggressive UNOSOM peacekeeping strategy and argued that the U.N. should not have abandoned its neutral role in Somalia.[28]

The inquiry criticized the United States for operating under a separate military command and leading raids against Aidid that were not coordinated with UNOSOM officers. The commission condemned the use of American combat helicopters over the heavily populated neighborhoods of Mogadishu and criticized tactics as "incompatible with basic tenets of peacekeeping". Financial reparations for Somali civilians who became victims of the fighting were recommend by the report.[28][12]

UNOSOM II forces were criticized for various instances of human rights abuses, violations of international law and excessive force by a wide range of academics, foreign correspondents and humanitarian organizations.[29][30][31][32] Doctors Without Borders,[33] Human Rights Watch[34] and Amnesty International[35] would all criticize UNOSOM II on these grounds. Africa Rights Watch and Doctors Without Borders would both publish detailed reports of abuses by UN forces during the summer of 1993.[32][36] While conceding UN troops were in a difficult position, the Africa Rights Watch report would conclude that abuses and atrocities carried out by UNOSOM II force were, "...not cases of undisciplined actions by individual soldiers, but stem from the highest echelons of the command structure,"[32]

Some of the most widely criticized events that occurred from 5 June to 3-4 October 1993 include:

• US forces fired missiles at Digfer Hospital in Mogadishu on the belief that Aidids forces were hiding in the buildings, resulting in the deaths of nine patients.[37][32] Africa Rights Watch would assert that the incident represented a prima-facie case that UN command in Mogadishu had violated the Geneva Convention.[32]
• Pakistani forces fired on two large public demonstrations killing over 20 Somalis, many of whom were women and children.[38]
• US Quick Reaction Force launched the 'Abdi House raid' during a meeting of Somali elders, resulting in the deaths of at least "60 unresisting civilians" according to Amnesty International.[39][36]
• Rony Brauman, then president of Doctors Without Borders, would report that the premises of Action Against Hunger in Mogadishu, which also housed the Doctors Without Borders team, was attacked by two US AH-1 Cobra helicopters. Despite the visible Red Cross flags and emblems of both humanitarian organizations the helicopters fired two missiles and then strafed the compound with machine-gun fire. One aid worker was killed and serval others were wounded. The incident had occurred because a vehicle belonging to nearby journalists from the television channel France 2 had seemed suspicious to the attack helicopters.[40]

• In mid-September US AH-1 Cobra helicopters killed nearly 100 Somalis who were in the vicinity of a clash between the SNA and the 10th Mountain Division using TOW missiles and cannon fire.[41] Children living in the surrounding neighborhood had also been killed by stray helicopter fire.[42]

UNOSOM II was criticized for over emphasizing military operations for a mission that was originally conceived to be a humanitarian operation. Over 90% of the operations $1.6 billion budget was used for military or security purposes.[43] In July 1993, UN relief head Jan Eliasson publicly admonished UNOSOM II for spending 10 times as much on military operations in Somalia than it did on aid. At the time he would caution that the original objective of sending troops to Somalia was being forgotten.[44]