Somali National Alliance

The Somali National Alliance (abbreviated SNA) was a political-military alliance formed on 16 June 1992 by four different rebel groups that had been in opposition to the regime of former Somali President Mohamed Siad Barre. The SNA was the first major inter-clan and inter-factional political alliance and was considered to be among the most powerful factions of the Somali Civil War. The alliance would most notably face off against the second phase of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM II) in the latter half of 1993.

Somali National Alliance
Soomaaliyeed Qaranka Isbahaysiga
AbbreviationSNA
ChairmanMohamed Farrah Aidid
Osman Ali Atto
Hussein Farrah Aidid
Founded16 June 1992 (16 June 1992)
Dissolved2002 (2002)
Split fromUnited Somali Congress
Merged intoSomalia Reconciliation and Restoration Council
and
Transitional National Government
HeadquartersMogadishu
IdeologyHawiye interests
Anti-Siad Barre
Anti-colonialism
Somali nationalism
National Reconciliation
ReligionSunni Islam

Following the 1991 split in the United Somali Congress (USC) between Mohamed Farah Aidid and his primary rival Ali Mahdi Muhammad and the routing of Barres forces out of Somalia and into Kenya during 1992, a tentative military coalition that had existed between different rebel organizations would morph into the political organization known as the SNA. The alliance would include Aidids breakaway wing of the USC, the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Southern National Movement (SSNM) and Somali Democratic Movement (SDM). The organization professed the goal of working toward forming a national reconciliation government and an eventual multi-party democracy.

The SNA would ultimately became the core of the Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SRRC), formed in 2001, which would be incorporated into the internationally recognized Transitional National Government in 2002.

History

Origins

During the mid to late 1980s various insurgencies of growing intensity would begin opposing the regime of Siad Barre that had ruled Somalia since 1969. Human rights abuses and atrocities by the regime during events like the 1988 Hargeisa-Burao offensive and Mogadishu riots of July 1989 inflamed insurgency. Formed in 1987, the United Somali Congress (USC) led by Gen. Mohamed Farah Aidid, played a leading role in toppling the government in Mogadishu in January 1991. The USC would split following a clash over the leadership of the new government between Aidid and Ali Mahdi Muhamed.[1]

Somali Liberation Army coalition

Reports that former President Siad Barres organization, the Somali National Front (SNF), was planning to retake Mogadishu led to the creation of a coalition consisting of four rebel groups: Aidids wing of the United Somali Congress (USC), the Somali Patriotic Movement (SPM), the Somali Democratic Movement (SDM) and the Somali Southern National Movement (SSNM).[2] On 17 April 1992 the Somali National Alliances short-lived predecessor, a military coalition known as the Somali Liberation Army (SLA), was formed.[3] Brigadier General Mohamed Farah Aidid would be elected chairman of the SLA that same day.[4]

The coalition was created with the express goal of preventing Barre from retaking the capital and to further push the last remnants of his troops out of Somalia.[3] Fierce back and forth fighting between SLA forces (led by General Aidid) and SNF forces loyal to President Barre in the fertile inter-riverine areas of southern Somalia would consequently result in the devastating 1992 famine.[5] According to SNA accounts of the final clashes, Barres forces outnumbered SLA forces over six times, but were ambushed and encircled when they left their base in Baidoa and came within 50km from Mogadishu. Following the defeat, Barres forces were routed into southern Somalia until they were pushed out into Kenya by the SLA on 29 April 1992.[3][6] According to the SLA, over 500 of Barres troops were taken as prisoners of war and then turned over to the Red Cross.[3]

On 14 May 1992, the SLA seized the strategically important southern port city of Kismayo, and three days later former President Barre would flee to Nigeria.[7][8] Early on in June 1992 the coalition would publicly announce that it would never accept the deployment of foreign troops on Somali soil, but welcomed and requested humanitarian aid.[9]

Formation of Somali National Alliance

Following the defeat of Siad Barres forces, on 16 June 1992 the SLA was phased out and the politico-military organization known as the Somali National Alliance was founded by the same four rebel groups of the SLA in the town of Bardere.[3][6] The Somali Liberation Army would instead morph into the military wing of the newly founded SNA.[10][11][12]

Primary clan composition of the SNA:

The SNA was the first major inter-clan and inter-factional political alliance of the Somali Civil War.[14] The organization professed the aim of working toward forming a national reconciliation government and an eventual multi-party democracy.[15] Mohammed Farah Aidid would be elected to serve as the first chairman and nominal leader of the SNA on 10 August 1992,[4] but his ability to impose decisions on the organization was limited, as a council of elders held decision-making power for most significant issues.[16] Osman Ali Atto would serve as the chief financier of the SNA.[16]

Following the organizations creation, Aidid would strive to add the Isaaq based Somali National Movement (SNM) and Majeerteen based Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF) to the SNA. If this goal were to be achieved, it would leave his prime rival Ali Mahdi as the only major remaining holdout to a unified national government.[17]

Military Capacity

Estimates of the strength of the SNA forces in Somalia ranged from around 5,000 to 10,000, with presumably 1,500 deployed in Mogadishu according to Historian Stephen Biddle. Estimates of SNA numerical strength are complicated due to the addition of civilian volunteers or other part-time combatants who supplemented SNA forces in battles, particularly against UNOSOM II. The most probable count of full-time SNA fighters across the country was likely less than 5,000.[18] Soon after its formation the organization was considered to be one of the most powerful factions involved in the Somali Civil War.[19] Most of the SNA's military leadership was made up of former Somali National Army personnel, many of whom possessed military experience.[20]

Militia troops were primarily equipped with light infantry weaponry, like the AK-47 assault rifle. Experienced fighters supplemented the main forces with RPG-7 rocket-propelled grenade launchers, sniper rifles, mortars, land mines, recoilless rifles and machine guns.[18]

United Nations Intervention

UNOSOM I and UNITAF

In late July 1992 the alliance announced that they were creating a "joint administrative body" to make security arrangements in order to reduce banditry and that they further rejected recent proposals to send 500 UN troops to Somalia. Instead they appealed to the UN to aid the creation of a 6,000 man strong police service to maintain security and Aidid would announce that he agreed with the deployment of 40 UN military observers to Mogadishu.[21]

By August 1992, Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General Mohammed Sahnoun successfully persuaded Aidid to enlarge the UN deployment. On 12 August, the Somali National Alliance signed an agreement allowing for the deployment of another 500 UN peacekeepers. However, as part of that agreement Sahnoun promised Aidid that any further deployments would require the consent of SNA leadership. To the surprise of both the SNA and UN Special Representative Mohammed Sahnoun, Secretary-General Boutros Ghali announced in a 24 August report that his intention to increase the size of UNOSOM from 500 to 3,500 and deploy the extra troops in four operational zones across the country. According to Professor Stephen Hill, "Knowing that this announcement threatened to undo all his long worked for local support, because it had been made ‘without consulting the Somali leaders and community elders’, Sahnoun attempted to have the deployments postponed until he could negotiate with Aideed. UN Headquarters was unsympathetic to his requests."[22]

The large scale international military intervention in late 1992 mobilized nationalist opposition to foreign troops in Somalia, which contributed to a significant growth of support for the SNA, which loudly decried perceived U.N. colonial practices.[23]

UNOSOM II

Following the 5 June 1993 attack on the Pakistanis, the SNA and UNOSOM II would engage in a four month long war until the 3-4 October 1993 Battle of Mogadishu.[24][25] The 5 June clash would result in the deaths of 25 Pakistani army peacekeepers and consequently would result in the passing of UNSCR 837 by the United Nations Security Council the following day. Directly naming the SNA, the resolution called for the arrest and punishment of those responsible for the attack, effectively creating a state of war between the SNA and UNOSOM II.[25]

The four month long conflict overturned much of the re-conciliatory process that had been made since the start of the intervention. A major turning point in UNOSOM and SNA fortunes came during the 12 July 1993 'Bloody Monday'. The raid had been conducted by the American Quick Reaction Force of UNOSOM II on what UN forces alleged to be an SNA command and control center. U.S. AH-1 Cobra helicopters killed up to 70 Somali clan elders and civilians, many of whom were reportedly not associated with Aidid. The raid has been noted for turning popular sentiment firmly against the intervention to the extent where, ..."even forces loyal to Ali Mahdi began to display open contempt for UNOSOM II."[25][26] Following the raid the conflict escalated and by mid-July firefights between UNOSOM forces and SNA militia were occurring almost daily.[27]

During the intervention the SNA would repeatedly utilize anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and anti-American rhetoric in publications, statements and radio broadcasts:

"Chairman Mohamed Farah Aidid called on the Somali people never to accept the colonialist device of divide-and-rule being applied by the United States and UNOSOM to divide the Somali people and realize their imperialist ambitions. On the contrary, the Somali people have the right to self-determination. He went on to appeal to the U.S. Congress and people to stop Clinton killing the Somali people and opposing their unity and wishes, which is damaging the image of the American people, of human rights, and the cooperation between the Somali and American peoples. He called on them to work towards settling the matter peacefully and justly" - transcript of SNA broadcast 2nd of September 1993[28]

A UNOSOM II propaganda leaflet depicting a Somali National Alliance fist crushing a dove that spells "PEACE" in Somali

Two days after the Battle of Mogadishu, on 6 October 1993, President Clinton ordered all US military forces in Somalia to cease actions against the Somali National Alliance, except in self defence.[29]

After the cessation of hostilities between the SNA and UNOSOM, Acting Special Representative Lansana Kouyate (replacing Adm. Johnathan Howe) successfully launched an initiative to normalize relations in March 1994. Numerous points of contention between the respective organizations were discussed at length and understandings were reached, facilitating the normalization of the relationship between the UN and the SNA.[30] That same year the UNOSOM forces began withdrawing, completing the process by 1995. The withdrawal of UNOSOM forces hurt Aidids stance within the SNA as the war had served to unify the alliance around a common foreign enemy.[26]

1994 to 2002

By 1994, the two principal factions contending for power in southern Somalia were the SNA and Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA), also known as the 'Group of 12'.[31] An October 1994 Central Intelligence Agency report assessed that the governments of both Meles Zenawi in Ethiopia and Isaias Afwerki in Eritrea had decided to arm and support the SNA. It was believed that both nations had decided to help establish a Somali government with Aidid as president.[32]

During the mid to late 90s the SNA would receive foreign support from numerous other states such as Iran and Uganda.[33][34]

Aidid–Atto split

In 1994 the SNA would suffer its first serious fracture when chief financier Osman Ali Atto and SNA forces loyal to him would break with the Aidid to ally with Ali Mahdi's SSA. That same year, the Somali National Movement (SNM) also suffered a serious fracture between President Ibrahim Egal of Somaliland and his predecessor Abdirahman Ahmed Ali Tuur. Tuur had allied himself with the Somali National Alliance and called for the reunification of Somaliland with Somalia. Fighting between the two factions broke out in Hargeisa in November 1994, which the forces of President Egal would eventually win,[35] ending Aidids aspirations of incorporating the SNM into an SNA government.[17]

In early January 1995 Abdirahman Agaweyne, an SNA representative, reportedly travelled abroad in order to solicit support for the SNA from the Iranian government. He would return to Somalia that same month with two aircraft loaded with Iranian weaponry and equipment, most notably twenty-three shoulder-fired anti-aircraft weapons.[34]

In April 1995 Osman Ali Atto would announce Aidid's signature no longer represented the SNA.[26] By June of that year Aidid was removed from chairmanship of the alliance during a vote conducted by the SNA congress, to be replaced by Atto.[36][37] In response, later that same month Aidid would declare himself President of Somalia prompting a joint statement from Ali Mahdi and Osman Atto condemning his declarations.[38][39] After the death of General Mohammed Farah Aidid in 1996, his son, Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid, took over the SNA.

Following Aidid's death in 1997, the Cairo Accord was signed by major Somali factions, most notably between the SNA and Ali Mahdi's Somali Salvation Alliance (SSA). The accord would collapse following Ethiopian pressure on the SSA to pull out of the agreement after signing.[40]

Merger with Somali Government

During reconciliation talks among Somali leaders in Kenya in December 2001, it was agreed that the Somali National Alliance would be folded into the Transitional National Government (TNG). The TNG proposed to the Transitional National Assembly that the number of cabinet members and parliamentarians be increased to make way for a broader-based government and on 20 January 2002, the assembly would pass the motion.[41]

Leaders of Somali National Alliance

Position Name Inaugurated Left Office Notes
Chairman Mohamed Farrah Aidid 1992 1995
Chairman Osman Ali Atto (1940–2013) 1995[36][37] 1996
Chairman Hussein Mohamed Farah Aidid 1996 1999
Abdulkadir Mohamed Aden (1919–2002) 1999 1999
Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed (1934–2012) 1999 2000
Aden Abdullahi Nur (1930–2002) 2000 2000
Mohamed Abshir Muse (acting) (b. 1926 – d. 2017) August 2000
August 2000
Abdallah Derow Isaq (acting) (b. 1950 – d. 2006) August 2000 22 August 2000
Abdiqasim Salad Hassan (b. 1941) 22 August 2000 2000
Abdinur Ahmed Darman|Abdinur Ahmed Darman 2000 2000
Somali Reconciliation and Restoration Council (SSRC) (counter-government, at Baidoa)
Chairman (rotating monthly) Hussein Farrah Aidid|Hussein Farrah Aidid 2000 2000
Hilowle Iman Omar (b. 1938? – d. 2010) USC 2000 2000
Hilowle Iimaan Cumar|Hilowle Iimaan Cumar 2000 2000
Aden Abdullahi Nur|Aden Abdullahi Nur 2000 2000
Hassan Mohammed Nur (b. 1946 – d. 2013) RRA 2000 2000
Xasan Maxamed Nuur|Xasan Maxamed Nuur 2001 2001
Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail|Abdullahi Sheikh Ismail 2001 2001
CabdillaahiSheekh Ismaaciil|CabdillaahiSheekh Ismaaciil 2001 2001

References

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  2. Drysdale 1994, p. 42-43.
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  6. Drysdale 1994, p. 44.
  7. Campbell & Rengger 1995, p. 463.
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Works Cited

  • Drysdale, John (1994). Whatever Happened to Somalia?: A tale of tragic blunders. Haan. ISBN 1874209510. OCLC 48195594
  • Hirsch, John L.; Oakley, Robert B. (1995). Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on Peacemaking and Peacekeeping. United States Institute of Peace Press. ISBN 1878379410.
  • Day, Alan John (1996). Political parties of the world. Stockton. ISBN 1561591440.
  • Mohammed, Mousa Sheikh (1998). Recolonization beyond Somalia. Somalia. OCLC 499185551.
  • Campbell, John; Rengger, N. J. (1995). Treaties and alliances of the world. London, U.K.: Cartermill. ISBN 1860670210.
  • Biddle, Stephen D. (2021). Nonstate warfare : The Military Methods of Guerillas, Warlords, and Militias. Princeton: Council on Foreign Relations. ISBN 978-0-691-20751-3. OCLC 1224042096.
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