248th Rifle Division

What was intended as the final German offensive on Moscow began in the south on September 30 with an assault on the Oryol axis led by 2nd Panzer Group. This quickly broke through the Soviet front, gaining 15-20km on the first day and creating a 30km-wide gap. Already that night the STAVKA was making the decision to block the Oryol, Kursk and Kharkiv axes in the rear of Bryansk Front. To this end the four rifle divisions of 49th Army, as well as its three cavalry divisions, were alerted for transfer by rail from their defensive line according to a set timetable. The 248th was set to depart second, following the 194th, from Kasnia Station at 1800 hours on October 3. This movement was based on a contingency plan made some time earlier. The 32nd Army's 140th Rifle Division arrived on the morning of October 2 to take over a sector of defense from the 905th Rifle Regiment and the 194th Division on the east bank of the Dniepr.[9]

Early on October 2 the main German offensive on the Vyazma axis began. As a result, the departure point of the 248th was not changed, but it was now to move to the Belyov area to help form a second echelon for Reserve Front. The STAVKA was not immediately aware of how quickly and deeply the 3rd and 4th Panzer Groups were penetrating the Soviet front lines. Spearheads of the 6th and 7th Panzer Divisions managed to break through to the Dniepr and from the march managed to seize two bridges in the 248th's sector, at Glushkovo and Tikhanovo on October 3. The division had only just received the order to cease loading onto the trains and re-occupy its positions. In connection with the confusion that arose due to this about-face there was no opportunity to blow up or at least set fire to the bridges. Although the upper reaches of this river are not wide (25-40m) or particularly deep (0.7-3.0m) it presented a major antitank obstacle. The approaches to it were covered by the fire from a variety of defensive works on the eastern bank. Despite this, on October 4, under cover of heavy artillery and mortar fire, 25-30 tanks crossed and dug in on the sectors of the 248th and 220th Divisions.[9]

Earlier that day the commander of Western Front, Col. Gen. I. S. Konev, had sent his deputy, Lt. Gen. S. A. Kalinin, to clarify the situation on the Dniepr. At 1950 hours this officer reported back that:

... [the enemy's] forward units, having infiltrated beyond the Dnepr River, continue to occupy the villages Tikhanovo, Glushkovo, Alad'ino and Ust'e. His strength in this region is not more than a battalion with 20 tanks...
North of the [Vyazma] river mouth, the defenses should be occupied by the 248th Rifle Division. It had been withdrawn to Novoduginskaia for entraining and is now returning. Major General Sverchevsky is now with me in the village of Tychkovo. The regiments will arrive in the middle of the night... The division commander intends to toss the enemy back beyond the Dnepr River at dawn on 5.10.
With the arrival of the 248th Rifle Division the situation will improve, but it must not be considered secure. Intervention is required.

At about this time the division came under the command of 32nd Army in Western Front. According to information recorded at Reserve Front headquarters at 2100 the same day, two regiments of the division were already "locked in combat" over the crossing as Glushkovo as early as 1800 and by 2000 had assembled along the Dniepr in the sector running from Parshino to the mouth of the Vyasma. As well, an attack by two German infantry companies had been driven back in the vicinity of the Tikhanovo crossing.[9] Beyond this, the division's efforts to eliminate the bridgeheads and reoccupy its former defenses failed. In the time it took to return the 45-50km from Novoduginskaya the panzer troops had managed to strengthen their positions. The division's hastily organized attacks were met with fire of all types, including dug-in tanks and artillery firing from the west bank. General Kalinin had reported to Konev at 2100 on October 5:

... The 248th Rifle Division: Two regiments engaged the enemy, were placed under pressure, and are retreating. The division commander and I are detaining and rallying the troops.
The situation is alarming. The division's third regiment is on the march from Konstantinovo to Nastas'ino, the 143rd Tank Brigade has passed through Konstantinovo. We are organizing a morning attack to restore the situation. Urgent measures are necessary. I'm now departing from the command post of the 248th Rifle Division's commander 3 kilometres west of Nastas'ino for Konstantinovo to meet the brigade and the 905th Rifle Regiment along the way.
General Vishnevsky was here at 1800; he knows the situation and is taking measures. He is reinforcing the 248th Rifle Division with a regiment from the 140th Rifle Division. But this is insufficient.

At 2200 on the same day General Sverchevskii, having no communications link with either the Western or Reserve Fronts, reported the following information directly to the STAVKA: "For 45 minutes already, [enemy] tanks and motorized infantry have been moving uninterruptedly from Baranovo through Kamenets to Volochek, the majority presumably toward Andreevskoe and the rest toward Nastas'ino." At 0030 on October 6 Kalinin reported from Novo-Mishnevo: "The units of the Reserve Front proved to be unprepared. The 248th Rifle Division with two regiments fought well, but the enemy broke through its right flank at the Glushkovo crossing."[10] With the breakout from Glushkovo the German offensive began to develop toward Vyazma, with part of their forces pivoting in the direction of Sychyovka. 7th Panzer Division was within 40km of Vyazma even before the breakout. At 1150 hours on October 6 the commander of 32nd Army, Maj. Gen. S. V. Vishnevskii reported to Konev:

... 2. The situation on 32nd Army's front changed dramatically on the morning of 6 October. Up to one tank division and one motorized division of the enemy broke through over the Glushkovo crossing...
My intended attack against this grouping with the 220th, 18th, 140th and 248th Rifle Divisions is developing slowly because of extremely heavy enemy air attacks. In the sector between the Dnepr and Viaz'ma Rivers, the 248th Rifle Division suddenly retreated...
The 18th, 248th and 140th Rifle Divisions have heavy losses in personnel and equipment. Problems with communications are having a disastrous effect.

By 1600 hours that day the 32nd Army had only limited forces under command, including roughly two regiments of the 248th in the area of Pigulino.[10] As planned, General Kalinin launched the 905th Regiment with the 143rd Tanks on an attack toward Volochek, with the assignment to separate the German infantry from their tanks and then restore the situation. However, this force lacked the strength to do so. Meanwhile, the forward detachment of 7th Panzer had reached the Moscow-Minsk highway north of Vyazma during the afternoon before deploying screening detachments to the east in the direction of Gzhatsk, and to the west. At 1600 hours on October 7 General Vishnevskii reported, in part:

5. The 248th Rifle Division as a result of stubborn fighting 4-6 October has been rendered combat ineffective and is reorganizing in the Baranovo area The division has managed to assemble up to 600 men and through the efforts of the 140th Rifle Division, another 900 men have been collected...
The main reason for our failures is the ceaseless, destructive bombing of our troops by enemy aviation and the absence of anti-aircraft means.

Vishnevskii was in the process of withdrawing his headquarters to Mozhaysk, but he would be captured on October 13.[10]

On October 7 the 7th Panzer linked up with 10th Panzer Division near Vyazma and the encirclement was completed. At 1030 on October 8, Lt. Gen. M. F. Lukin, commander of 19th Army, reported to STAVKA on the situation in his sector of the encirclement, in part:

5) Units of the 32nd Army have occupied the following positions:
... b)Remnants of the 248th and 140th Rifle Division in an aggregate number of up to 200 men have dropped down to the woods southwest of LOMY. At my order this group is to take up a defense in the area of KELITA [sic - correct is Khmelita, 32km southwest of Vyazma].

Lukin had established his headquarters near Lomy, which had been attacked by the 114th Infantry Regiment of 6th Panzer Division. He spent all of October 8 restoring order and regrouping for the breakout from encirclement. At this time some remnants of the 248th were occupying a defense at Koporikha on the Vazuza River north of Vyazma, outside the encirclement. According to some records the division attempted to assist the breakout of 19th Army, but its attack was driven back. The encirclement battle was effectively finished by October 18; on this date the division was left with only 681 personnel.[11] In common with many other divisions destroyed in Operation Typhoon the 248th officially remained in the Red Army order of battle until December 27 when it was finally written off. General Sverchevskii took command of the 43rd Reserve Rifle Brigade for a few months and then served as commandant of the Kiev Rifle Officers School until mid-1943, when he was transferred to the Polish Army of the East. He ended the war in command of the 2nd Polish Army and reached the rank of colonel general before being killed by Ukrainian nationalists in March 1947.

At this time the 6th Army was located in the northern sector of the Izium-Barvinkove salient south of Kharkiv. On May 11 the 248th was located in a reserve position near the town of Mykhailivka. In the plan of the offensive, which began on May 12, two shock groups were to penetrate the German front and advance to encircle and recapture Kharkiv; the southern shock group consisted of the 6th Army and Army Group Bobkin to its left. Together the group had eight rifle and three cavalry divisions, plus 11 tank and two motorized rifle brigades and would advance on a 36km-wide front.[16]

The southern shock group began its attack at 0730 hours following a 60-minute artillery preparation. It struck forces of VIII and LI Army Corps on a front from Verkhnii Bishkin through Alekseevskoe and Grushino to Mironovka, but this did not directly involve the 248th in second echelon. As the offensive developed over the next days, particularly in the direction of Krasnohrad, the division remained in place. On May 15 it began moving toward the fighting front through the Bereka River valley along with some of the reserve tank formations. In response to the offensive as a whole the 1st Panzer Army south of the salient began regrouping on May 16 for a counterstrike against the 9th Army of Southern Front on the currently inactive south facing of the salient.[17]

On the morning of May 17 the German forces went over to the offensive. The attack struck the boundary between the 341st and 106th Rifle Divisions, while on a second axis it hit the front of the 51st Rifle Division and the left flank of the 335th Rifle Division. By 0800 the 9th Army's defensive had been penetrated to a depth of as much as 10km. By noon this depth had increased to 20km and the leading units of 14th Panzer Division were fighting along the southern outskirts of Barvinkove. At this time the 248th was still in 6th Army's reserves at Efremovka as this disaster unfolded far to its rear. Marshal S. K. Timoshenko, commander of Southwestern Front, reported to the STAVKA at 1730 that the German attack likely aimed "to secure the Barvenkovo, Izium region and attempt to cut off [our] offensive on Kharkov from the south."[18]

Shortly after this, Lt. Gen. I. K. Bagramyan, Timoshenko's chief of staff, received intelligence from documents captured by 38th Army that German 6th Army was planning to attack the salient from the north as well. Despite Bagramyan's entreaties to act, Timoshenko limited himself to ordering the transfer of the 21st Tank Corps and the 248th to restore 9th Army's defensive positions. Timoshenko was determined to continue the southern shock group's offensive. On May 18 the division began its retrograde movement to the southeast, but Barvinkove had already fallen and Izium was under threat. By 2300 hours on May 19 it was back to southeast of Mykhailivka with the 21st Tanks. At noon that day Timoshenko had finally accepted that, not only had his offensive failed, but the armies in the salient were faced with catastrophe.[19]

Timoshenko ordered a regrouping at 1730 hours. The forces of the southern shock group were to go over to the defense. In addition, the 248th, along with several other formations, were to remain in or return to control of 6th Army. While two divisions were to defend the right bank of the Northern Donets River the remainder, including the 248th, were to defeat the German grouping near Barvinkove and, in cooperation with 9th and 57th Armies of Southern Front, restore the situation on that Front's right flank. During the night of May 20/21 the division, along with the 411th and 103rd Rifle Divisions, was moved to a line from Krasnopavlovka to the Bereka to conduct a counterattack against the left flank of 1st Panzer Army. But on May 22 that Army linked up with 6th Army advancing from the north and the Soviet forces in the salient were encircled.[20]

Timoshenko now called for a concerted breakout to the west from the encircled salient by the combined remnants of 6th and 57th Armies. This was to link up with a relief force of 38th Army, which was to fight its way through German lines west of the Northern Donets. This force was slow to form and the plan came to nothing. Meanwhile the German forces were widening the corridor dividing the pocket from the main Soviet forces to as much as 25km. During May 23 and 24 the encircled troops attacked the corridor in a desperate but more realistic aim of breaking out to the east. The 248th was initially on the west bank of the Bereka facing the German-held village of Marivka on the opposite side. The German 1st Mountain Division was located inside the corridor to act against any Red Army breakthroughs from either side. On the 24th the remnants of 57th Army linked up with the division, which was making some progress in crossing the river and retaking Marivka. The main breakout effort began 1000 hours on May 25, but the 248th was initially assigned a defensive role guarding the south flank of the breakout shock group. The breakout remained disorganized throughout the day.[21]

In conjunction with the 411th Division and 23rd Tank Corps the 248th sidestepped to the north and pushed across the Bereka, reaching Panteleeva "Balka" against forces of 60th Motorized Division. This force was now about one-third across the corridor, but now ran into 1st Mountain. During May 26 the breakout group, which had also been largely repelled, linked up with the right flank of the two divisions. Formed units were unable to break through, but individuals and small groups were managing to escape. In the end around 22,000 men emerged from the pocket.[22] The 248th disappeared from the order of battle maps after May 26, but it was not officially disbanded until June 30.[23]

Colonel Alekseev left the division on December 22. He would go on to a number of artillery commands and was promoted to the rank of lieutenant general in September 1945. He was replaced by Lt. Col. Nikolai Zakharovich Galai, who had previously led the 93rd Rifle Brigade. During this month the 28th Army was reassigned to Southern Front. As of January 1, 1943 the 248th was the only rifle division in the Army, although it also had six rifle brigades and two fortified regions.[32]

• Affairs Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1967b). Сборник приказов РВСР, РВС СССР, НКО и Указов Президиума Верховного Совета СССР о награждении орденами СССР частей, соединениий и учреждений ВС СССР. Часть II. 1945 – 1966 гг [Collection of orders of the RVSR, RVS USSR and NKO on awarding orders to units, formations and establishments of the Armed Forces of the USSR. Part II. 1945–1966] (in Russian). Moscow.
• Grylev, A. N. (1970). Перечень № 5. Стрелковых, горнострелковых, мотострелковых и моторизованных дивизии, входивших в состав Действующей армии в годы Великой Отечественной войны 1941-1945 гг [List (Perechen) No. 5: Rifle, Mountain Rifle, Motor Rifle and Motorized divisions, part of the active army during the Great Patriotic War 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Voenizdat. p. 112
• Main Personnel Directorate of the Ministry of Defense of the Soviet Union (1964). Командование корпусного и дивизионного звена советских вооруженных сил периода Великой Отечественной войны 1941–1945 гг [Commanders of Corps and Divisions in the Great Patriotic War, 1941–1945] (in Russian). Moscow: Frunze Military Academy. pp. 225-26