Kurdish-Islamic nationalism

Kurdish-Islamic nationalism, (Kurdish: کوردایەتی ئیسلامی, romanized: Kurdayetî Îslamî) also known as Kurdish-Islamic synthesis,[1][2] is a form of Kurdish nationalism which is Islamist in nature, unlike mainstream Kurdish nationalism, which is largely secularist.[3][4]

History

The ideology emerged after the abolition of the Caliphate and the creation of Turkey, two events which angered many Kurds, who felt that their culture, religion, language, and people were endangered because of Atatürk's reforms.[5]

Even more extreme Islamist Kurds, such as Mullah Krekar, often profess some degree of nationalism. In some videos, Mullah Krekar speaks about Kurdish issues and supporting Kurdish independence. He was described as "publishing political and nationalistic statements one day, and Jihadi statements on the next".

Mullah Krekar is also a populist, and his popularity in Iraqi Kurdistan rose between 2017 and 2019, mainly among the youth who were against the Kurdish government. Mullah Krekar also added that secularism "has destroyed Kurdish values".[6]

Kurdish Islamonationalism is often hostile to other nationalisms in the region, and ias also against Secularism, Kemalism, and Ba'athism.[7][3]

Ali Bapir is seen as the most prominent and influential contemporary Kurdish Islamist.[8]

Criticism

Many of Kurdistan Islamic Union's politicians, including their leader Salahaddin Bahaaddin, have criticized the ideology, saying that "This is a huge heresy", "Islam can not be nationalized", and that "There is only one Islam, the Islam of Allah." Many other people have also called the ideology "chauvinistic", "supremacist" "anti-Turkish", "Anti-Arabism", and "un-scientific". Secular Kurds often criticise this ideology and have had many instances of violence against Kurdish-Islamic synthesists.[9]

Organizations

Sunni Muslim

Iran
Iraq
Syria
Turkey

Shia Muslim

Kurdish-Islamic nationalists

See also

References

  1. "Secular Turks fear Kurdish–Islamic synthesis after presidentials". Hürriyet Daily News. Retrieved 2022-08-12.
  2. "Türk İslâm sentezinden Kürt İslâm sentezine - Yeni Akit". www.yeniakit.com.tr (in Turkish). Retrieved 2022-08-12.
  3. Övet, Kerem; Hewitt, James; Abbas, Tahir (February 23, 2022). "Understanding PKK, Kurdish Hezbollah and ISIS Recruitment in Southeastern Turkey". Studies in Conflict & Terrorism: 1–21. doi:10.1080/1057610X.2022.2042897. S2CID 247117013.
  4. "Islamists of Kurdistan: Contradictions Between Identity and Freedom". The Washington Institute.
  5. Hassan, Mona (10 January 2017). Longing for the Lost Caliphate: A Transregional History. Princeton University Press. ISBN 978-1-4008-8371-4.
  6. Mahmud Yasin Kurdi (29 September 2016). "Time has come to break from Iraq, says radical Kurdish cleric Mulla Krekar". rudaw.net. Archived from the original on 29 November 2016. Retrieved 28 November 2016.
  7. "Islamists of Kurdistan: Contradictions Between Identity and Freedom". The Washington Institute.
  8. "Los Angeles Review of Books". Los Angeles Review of Books. May 8, 2019.
  9. Gade, Tine; Palani, Kamaran (22 May 2022). "The hybridisation of religion and nationalism in Iraqi Kurdistan: The case of Kurdish Islam". Third World Thematics: A TWQ Journal. 5 (3–6): 221–241. doi:10.1080/23802014.2022.2070269. S2CID 249036504.
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