Gaius Hostilius Mancinus

Gaius Hostilius Mancinus was a Roman politician and general of the Roman Republic. Mancinus is mostly known for his defeat against the Numantines as consul in 137 BC and the humiliating treaty he signed afterwards. After his return to Rome, the senate rejected his treaty and, to mend a break with the gods, surrendered him to the Numantines. The main political divide during the affair was between Mancinus and his enemies around Scipio Aemilianus. His former quaestor during the campaign against Numantia, Tiberius Gracchus, defended both him and the treaty, as he was the one who had conducted the negotiations with the Numantines.

After the Numantines refused to take him, Mancinus again returned to Rome where he recovered some popularity for his courageous behaviour during the affair. On his return, he was stripped of his citizenship and seat in the senate, but he was eventually able to have legislation passed restoring his citizenship and was later successful in securing a second praetorship, restoring him to the senate.

Family background

Mancinus belonged to the plebeian gens Hostilia, which emerged in the late 3rd century. Its first consul was this Mancinus' father, Aulus Hostilius Mancinus in 170.[1][2] In 145, Aulus' nephew and Mancinus' cousin, Lucius Hostilius Mancinus, was consul.[1][3] His electoral campaign, based on his military achievements during the Third Punic War, earned him and his family the enmity of Scipio Aemilianus, the official winner of the war and a leading politician in the period.[4][5][6] This Mancinus also had an elder brother named Aulus, who was possibly aedile in 151.[7][1][8]

Career

Praetorship (c. 140 BC)

By 140,[9] Mancinus was elected praetor, probably urbanus, because he presided over the senate during the vote on the senatus consultum de Narthaciensibus et Melitaeensibus, which arbitrated a border dispute between Narthakion and Melitaia, two allied cities in Thessaly.[10] Roman policy regarding allies' territories was to return to the situation at the date of the initial treaty with Rome, but in this affair, Melitaia became an ally before Narthakion, and their territory changed meanwhile, so both had a valid claim. The senate therefore chose to revert to the situation at the time of Titus Quinctius Flamininus, who as proconsul had established the Thessalian League in 195, and sided with Narthakion.[11][12]

Consulship and the Numantine affair (137–136 BC)

Spain and Numantia in the middle of the 2nd century BC.

Mancinus was elected consul for 137 with Marcus Aemilius Lepidus Porcina as his colleague.[13] Political life of the period was dominated by the difficult Numantine War in Hispania. In order to reduce competition for military commands in Spain, the senate adopted a system of pairing a consul with a proconsul (who was consul the previous year) in the two Spanish provinces (which were normally awarded to praetors). Decimus Junius Brutus, consul in 138, was therefore given Hispania Ulterior, while Mancinus received Hispania Citerior.[14]

During the campaign, Mancinus suffered several defeats until he was trapped and surrounded by the 4,000 Numantines, although the Romans were five times as numerous.[15][16] The place was possibly the village of Renieblas, where the consul Quintus Fulvius Nobilior had been also trapped in 153.[17] Mancinus felt that he had no other choice but to negotiate with the Numantines, and ordered his quaestor, Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus to deal with them.[18] Tiberius' father had also fought the Numantines some decades earlier and left a favourable impression on them.[19][20] The peace saved 20,000 Roman soldiers and preserved Roman territory in exchange for their weapons and baggage.[lower-roman 1][21][22] A few years earlier, in 140, the proconsul Quintus Pompeius had also negotiated a treaty with the Numantines, but it was repudiated by the senate.[23] This time, the Numantines demanded that Mancinus and his staff swear religious oaths to uphold the treaty.[19][16]

However, in Rome it was felt that the only acceptable outcome of the war would be a capitulation (deditio).[18][24] When news of the treaty reached the senate in Rome, it logically caused a "massive political storm".[25] Mancinus was immediately stripped of his command and recalled, even though a Numantine delegation came with him to Rome.[19] His consular colleague Lepidus Porcina replaced him. The senate then likely delayed any discussion of the matter until Mancinus' consulship elapsed.[26] The new consuls for 136 were supporters of Scipio Aemilianus, Mancinus' enemy.[25] Mancinus and his officers, especially Tiberius Gracchus, defended themselves and the treaty they had reached on two grounds: that the troops with which he had to fight were lazy and undertrained due to his predecessor's incompetence – itself evidenced by his predecessor too had lost battles against the same foe – and that the war had been renewed in violation of Pompeius' treaty and therefore was inauspicious.[27] These defences were generally consistent with aristocratic thinking about the aetiology of military defeat, which tended to place blame on the soldiers and poor relations with the gods rather than the actions of senatorial commanders.[28]

Denarius minted by Tiberius Veturius in 137 BC in support of Mancinus' treaty with the Numantines. The coin shows an oath taken by Romans and non-Romans.

A rare contemporary source of the event is a denarius minted by the triumvir monetalis Tiberius Veturius Gracchus in 137.[29] This coin set a milestone in Roman coinage as it broke from the traditional civic symbols of the Republic and featured instead personal and political imageries.[30] The reverse shows a scene of oath, with a Roman pictured on the right, a non-Roman on the left; they are both depicting touching their sword on a pig about to be sacrificed by a third character kneeling.[31] The scene likely refers to the disaster of the Caudine Forks in 321, during which a Roman army was trapped by the Samnites and forced to negotiate an unfavourable peace. The army was led by Titus Veturius Calvinus, a distant ancestor of the moneyer, who was also a natural cousin of Tiberius Gracchus.[32] At this time, the scene can have only been a reference to Mancinus' treaty, by insisting on fides Romana and respecting the oaths. It seems that two versions of the Caudine Forks story circulated at the time: one in which the Romans kept their oath, while the other told how the Romans broke the treaty and launched a victorious campaign the following year. The latter story is fictitious and partially built on the development of Mancinus' case.[33] Veturius' propaganda did not work and only the invented version survived in subsequent Roman historiography, such as in Livy's Ab Urbe Condita written a century later.[34][35]

The main difficulty for the senate in repudiating Mancinus' treaty was the religious oath he and his staff swore on behalf of the Roman people, as breaking it would have damaged the pax deorum.[36][37] The senate commissioned the consul Lucius Furius Philus with finding a solution.[38][39] Philus was a good friend of Scipio Aemilianus and member of the Scipionic Circle around him. Scipio and another friend Laelius were moreover mentioned as members of Philus' consilium (advisory council).[40] Philus' solution was to consider that the person who made the illegal treaty had to be repudiated and returned to the other party, probably by misrepresenting the Caudine Forks story as precedent.[41] Philus drafted three bills to put before the assembly, one returning Mancinus to the Numantines, the second Mancinus' staff, and the third Pompeius – the former consul of 141 and Scipio's bitter enemy – and had their proposals approved by the senate for assembly ratification. After the senate voted to surrender him, Mancinus accepted his fate and even supported his own demise, speaking to that effect before the assembly, as it was the only way for him to respect his oath.[lower-roman 2][42][43][44] Tiberius Gracchus and Pompeius nevertheless convinced voters to reject the bills exiling them.[45] By separating Mancinus from his staff, it seems that Scipio wanted to spare his brother-in-law Tiberius Gracchus.[46] The consul Philus then went to Spain accompanied by the Fetial priests to surrender Mancinus to the Numantines naked and bound in chains, according to an archaic ritual.[47] Mancinus was placed in chains before the gates of Numantia where he remained until nightfall, but the Numantines refused to take him, and he was brought back to Rome.[lower-roman 3][48][49]

The classicist A. E. Astin considers that Scipio Aemilianus was the main instigator and victor of the sequence against Mancinus.[50]

From demotion to rehabilitation (after 135 BC)

After the whole incident, Mancinus returned to Rome and again took up his seat in the senate, as he was probably confirmed during the lectio of 136. The new censors who wrote the lectio were indeed sympathetic to Mancinus: Appius Claudius Pulcher was the father-in-law of Tiberius Gracchus; his censorial colleague, Quintus Fulvius Nobilior, had similarly been defeated by the Numantines in 153.[51] However, Publius Rutilius, a tribune of the plebs, contested the lectio, and argued that Mancinus had lost his citizenship after his ritual surrender. A trial took place, which adopted Rutilius' opinion; the distinguished jurist and praetor that year Publius Mucius Scaevola spoke against Mancinus at this occasion.[lower-roman 4][52] Rutilius' motivation was possibly to settle a score against Pulcher and Tiberius Gracchus, whose fathers as censors had removed his uncle from his equestrian status during the lectio of 169.[53]

After his demotion, Mancinus started a campaign to recover his former place. Like his cousin Lucius, who had made a painting of the siege of Carthage to glorify his role during the war, Mancinus used visual arts for his bid, and commissioned a statue that represented him with the appearance he had when surrendered to the Numantines, naked and in chains.[54][44] It is the first mention in the sources of a statue depicting a naked Roman, who preferred at the time to be shown in toga or military uniform.[lower-roman 5][55] Mancinus' story of his voluntary sacrifice to keep his oath and preserve the diplomatic reputation of Rome brought him admiration among citizens. Cicero and Plutarch later mentioned him favourably. Perhaps soon after 135, a bill was then carried in the assembly granting him citizenship anew.[lower-roman 6][56] Mancinus did not stop there and sought to regain his place in the senatorial order by resuming his political career. He was successful in being elected to a second praetorship, which guaranteed him a place in the senate at the next lectio. Second praetorships were rare during the Republic and may have been a way of rehabilitating disgraced politicians.[57][58]

References

Ancient sources

  1. Plutarch, Tiberius Gracchus, 5 § 4.
  2. Cicero, De re publica, iii.14.
  3. Velleius Paterculus, ii.1 § 5.
  4. Cicero Epistulae ad Atticum xii.5; De oratore, i.181.
  5. Pliny, Natural History, xxxiv.18.
  6. Digest, l.7 § 17.

Modern sources

  1. Zmeskal 2009, p. 137.
  2. Broughton 1951, p. 419.
  3. Broughton 1951, p. 469.
  4. Astin 1967, pp. 71 n. 1, 91, 99, he claimed to have been the first Roman soldier to break through the walls of Carthage.
  5. Gruen 1968, pp. 25–26.
  6. Brennan 2000, p. 216.
  7. Münzer 1913, p. 2507.
  8. Broughton 1951, p. 455.
  9. Broughton 1951, p. 480, noting 140 as the "last possible date".
  10. Brennan 2000, p. 118.
  11. Sherk 1984, p. 38.
  12. Chaniotis 2004, pp. 193–94.
  13. Broughton 1951, p. 484.
  14. Brennan 2000, p. 244.
  15. Münzer 1913, col. 2509.
  16. Rosenstein 1986, p. 232.
  17. Brennan 1989, p. 486.
  18. Astin 1967, p. 131.
  19. Münzer 1913, col. 2510.
  20. Broughton 1951, p. 393.
  21. Steel 2013, p. 12.
  22. Rosenstein 1986, p. 234.
  23. Astin 1967, pp. 148–49.
  24. Crawford 1973, p. 3.
  25. Astin 1967, p. 179.
  26. Rosenstein 1986, p. 236 n. 17.
  27. Rosenstein 1986, pp. 236, 241, Rosenstein also notes that the previous treaty had not been ratified; Mancinus likely stressed the breach of Roman fides and moral ratification instead.
  28. Rosenstein 1986, p. 237–41.
  29. Rosenstein 1986, pp. 241–42.
  30. Crawford 1973, p. 4.
  31. Crawford 1974, pp. 266–67.
  32. Badian 1968, pp. 34–36.
  33. Crawford 1973, pp. 2, 6.
  34. Crawford 1973, pp. 6–7.
  35. See Oakley 2005, pp. 25–31, 648–51 for extensive treatment of the matter. Oakley is a bit sceptical of Crawford's reasoning.
  36. Astin 1967, pp. 132, 150–51.
  37. Rosenstein 1986, p. 233, "strictly speaking, the central question before the senate was not how to punish those responsible, but how the Roman people could refuse to accept the treaty without the risk of divine displeasure"; p. 245
  38. Rosenstein 1986, p. 245.
  39. Oakley 2005, p. 649.
  40. Astin 1967, pp. 132, 179.
  41. Astin 1967, p. 132.
  42. Rosenstein 1986, p. 251.
  43. Brennan 2006, p. 54, suggests that as the Numantine envoys were in Rome for some time, Mancinus had grown confident that nothing would happen to him if he was surrendered to them.
  44. Steel 2013, p. 13 n. 18.
  45. Rosenstein 1986, p. 247.
  46. Astin 1967, pp. 133, 179.
  47. Steel 2013, p. 13, p. 13 n. 18.
  48. Münzer 1913, col. 2511.
  49. Steel 2013, pp. 13, 68
  50. Astin 1967, pp. 179, 181, noting, however, that Scipio was not completely successful as he failed to punish Pompeius.
  51. Brennan 2006, p. 52.
  52. Broughton 1951, pp. 486–87.
  53. Brennan 2006, p. 55.
  54. Brennan 2006, pp. 50, 51, 53.
  55. Etcheto 2012, p. 431.
  56. Rosenstein 1986, pp. 250, 251.
  57. Briscoe 1981, p. 131.
  58. Brennan 1989, pp. 478, 486, 487, disagrees with Briscoe, principally because of a lack of evidence.

Bibliography

Ancient sources

Modern sources

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  • Badian, Ernst (1968). "Sulla's augurate". Arethusa. 1 (1): 26–46. ISSN 0004-0975.
  • Brennan, T. Corey (1989). "C. Aurelius Cotta, Praetor Iterum (CIL l2. 610)". Athenaeum (77): 467–487.
  • Brennan, T. Corey (2000). The praetorship in the Roman republic. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ISBN 0-19-511459-0. OCLC 41503761.
  • Brennan, T. Corey (2006). "Power and Process under the Republican "Constitution"". In Flower, Harriet (ed.). The Cambridge Companion to the Roman Republic. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. pp. 31–65. ISBN 978-1-1390-0033-8.
  • Briscoe, John (1981). A Commentary on Livy, Books XXXIV-XXXVII. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 0198144555.
  • Broughton, Thomas Robert Shannon (1951). The magistrates of the Roman republic. Vol. 1. New York: American Philological Association.
  • Chaniotis, Angelos (2004). "Justifying territorial claims in classical and hellenistic Greece: the beginnings of international law". In Harris, Edward Monroe; Rubinstein, Lene (eds.). The law and the courts in ancient Greece. London: Duckworth. pp. 185–213. ISBN 0-7156-3117-9. OCLC 55014391.
  • Crawford, Michael H (1973). "Foedus and sponsio". Papers of the British School at Rome. 41: 1–7. ISSN 0068-2462.
  • Crawford, Michael H (1974). Roman republican coinage. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0-521-07492-4. OCLC 310578773.
  • Etcheto, Henri (2012). Les Scipions. Famille et pouvoir à Rome à l’époque républicaine. Bordeaux: Ausonius Éditions. ISBN 978-2-35613-124-9.
  • Gruen, Erich S (1968). Roman politics and the criminal courts, 149-78 B.C. Harvard University Press. ISBN 978-0-674-28421-0. OCLC 576654216.
  • Münzer, Friedrich (1913). "Hostilius 18". In Pauly, August (ed.). Realencyclopädie der Classischen Altertumswissenschaft (in German). Vol. 16. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler. cols. 2508–2511.
  • Oakley, Stephen P (2005). A commentary on Livy, Books VI-X. Vol. 3. Oxford: Clarendon Press. ISBN 978-0-1992-7143-6. OCLC 34546163.
  • Rosenstein, Nathan (1986). ""Imperatores victi": the case of C Hostilius Mancinus". Classical Antiquity. 5 (2): 230–252. doi:10.2307/25010850. ISSN 0278-6656.
  • Sherk, Robert K. (1984). Translated Documents of Greece and Rome vol. 4, Rome and the Greek East to the Death of Augustus. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 9780521271233.
  • Steel, Catherine (2013). The end of the Roman republic, 149 to 44 BC: conquest and crisis. Edinburgh History of Ancient Rome. Edinburgh University Press. ISBN 978-0-7486-1944-3.
  • Zmeskal, Klaus (2009). Adfinitas (in German). Vol. 1. Passau: Verlag Karl Stutz. ISBN 978-3-88849-304-1.
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